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∗
Abstract: This paper will treat the relations between Macedonia and Serbia. The 
separation of the Republic of Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation was carried 
out in totally peaceful way and without any military confrontations with its 
neighbor Serbia. This situation was the basis and gave hope for building great 
future relations between the two countries. However, things were not going so 
easy. The existence of aggressive regime of Milosevic in Serbia and his tendency to 
make Serbia a regional superpower were not the best basis for building an equal 
relationship between the largest former Yugoslav and most powerful military 
Republic of Serbia and the small and virtually without military power Republic of 
Macedonia. This paper will mostly rely on qualitative research methods.  In this 
why we will be able to present the current relations between the two neighboring 
states including the historical factors too.  
Keywords: Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Serbia, bilateral relations  
Geographical proximity and historical circumstances were factors which 
impacted Macedonia and Serbia in one part of their historical past to share the 
same fate and both being under the occupation of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike 
Macedonia, the uprising against Ottoman rule in Serbia was successful and it 
gained full autonomy at the very beginning and later in 1878 independence with a 
gradual process. Macedonia remains under the Ottoman Empire till 1913, when 
with the Bucharest agreement its territory became seceded between its neighbors. 
The territory of the Republic of Macedonia, as it is today, belonged to Serbia or 
later to the Kingdom of SHS. Within the Kingdom of SHS, Macedonian nation 
was not recognized as separate and was called “South-Serbian”. 
On 11 October 1941, the armed revolution in Macedonia against the fascist 
occupiers began. By raising this revolution, Macedonia becomes part of the anti-
fascist struggle of the Yugoslav peoples, as a building foundation of future 
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Macedonian state within Yugoslavia, which will formally be realized with the 
decisions of ASNOM
1
. With the creation of the post-war Yugoslav federation there 
were some changes upcoming in this policy and RM became a constituent 
republic, the Macedonian people was recognized by the Serbian and the 
Macedonian language became official in RM
2
. Nearly half century of common 
living as equal and constituent republics of the Yugoslav federation contributed to 
creation of numerous economic and other links. With dissolution of Yugoslavia 
two separate states were formed: the Republic of Macedonia on one side and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
3
 on the other side. A good part of the Macedonian 
politicians tried to save Yugoslavia and help her transformation in some other form 
until the last minute, what was also the expression of will of the big part of the 
population, according to Ackermann “A poll in April 1991, for example, indicated 
that 60 percent of Macedonian’s population preferred a restructured Yugoslavia of 
sovereign republic”
4
. Furthermore according to Mirchev there were even some 
leading analysts from Slovenia that in 1989 wrote that the Macedonians are not 
mature enough for an independent state
5
.  
Such mood in Macedonia was often interpreted as pro-Serbian, or absence 
of sufficient self-awareness for their own state. We do not agree with this because, 
although there was obviously pro-Yugoslavian feeling in Macedonia, it is not the 
same with pro-Serbian feeling.  
However, in a given historical moment when it became clear that 
Yugoslavia will no longer exist, Macedonia correctly chose the path of 
independence. Practically with this it can deny the allegations of pro-Serbian 
position of Macedonia and pro-Serb feelings among the Macedonian people. By 
voting for independence instead of staying in a mini-dominated Serbian federation, 
Macedonia and Macedonians actually showed that when they talk about 
preservation of Yugoslavia actually were in pro-Yugoslavian mood and not in pro-
Serbian, because at the moment when Yugoslavia could not survive as such, 
Macedonia decided for independence. 
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Under these circumstances, the referendum caused distress within two 
ethnic groups in the country too. These were the Albanians and Serbs living in 
Macedonia. “The referendum held in 1991 was nearly unanimous in favor of 
independence, with Serbs and Albanians, however, boycotting it”
6
. Both groups 
declined to participate in the referendum and boycotted it but from entirely 
different motives. This was certainly a potential problem that has a capacity for 
breach of safety and security of Macedonia.  
There was a significant difference between Serbian and Albanian minority 
in Macedonia. The Serb minority was far less numerous, somewhere less than 2% 
of the total population according to official statistics. Yet at the same time both 
minorities had something in common and that was speculating with their real 
number in order to use this for political purposes. Same as Albania, Serbia too did 
not recognize the official number of Serbs living in Macedonia. “Serbia insists on 
special status of its minority that they claim to amount to 300, 00- 400.000 people 
(out of population of 2 million), even though, according to the official data, only 
40,000 Serbs live in Macedonia and enjoy all the usual minority rights”
7
. Still the 
possible danger was not arising from the relatively small Serbian minority number 
i.e. the potential danger to the security of Macedonia did not came from there, size 
expressed in numbers. Regardless of the percentage, the fact was that the Serbs 
decide to boycott the referendum, and with this there was a danger to play on the 
same scenario as in Croatia or to proclaim their own state within a state.  
Their strength consisted in the fact that the YNA was increasingly 
controlled by Serbia and therefore they had the military power to implement such a 
plan. The possible danger from Serbia was much more real threat to the security of 
Macedonia due to the existence of a powerful military force in the hands of 
Belgrade. Thus the initial criticism and opposition demands for the YNA, 
following the example of Slovenia and Croatia, proved to be unjustified and a 
military conflict was avoided. This certainly was a great success for the 
Macedonian political leadership. In one hand the goal was achieved - YNA left the 
Macedonian territory and on the other hand this was done without military 
confrontation like in other Yugoslav republics. This outcome was not only 
products of the success of the Macedonian political leadership. What else was it 
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about? The real reasons for the withdrawal of Serb – dominated YNA was not 
because there was too much of a mutual respect between Macedonia and 
Serbia/Yugoslav army, nor too good Macedonian diplomatic activity. But also, 
leaving the federal army was not meant to provide automatic recognition of 
Macedonia's independence from Belgrade. “(…) the only peaceful secession that 
has occurred in Yugoslavia was not achieved simply by Gligorov’s tactful 
diplomatic style and acumen. (…)  The Yugoslav Army’s (YPA) withdrew from 
Macedonia, began a few weeks before Bosnia’s independence declaration of 
sovereignty in March 1992, which was followed by heavy fighting there. Milosevic 
has decided he actually could not afford both to keep troops in Macedonia and to 
fight the Bosnian war”
8
.  
Actually it is about a tactical maneuver of President Milosevic who 
calculated that the further storage of military troops in Macedonia becomes 
meaningless in a situation when a huge Bosnian conflict is expected where a big 
part of the population is Serbs. At the same time, the withdrawal of the YNA did 
not have to be permanent at all, but only temporarily. Following that logic of 
thinking, YNA could later come back in Macedonia ether voluntarily or violently.  
“He (Milosevic) apparently concluded that he could let Macedonia go for time 
being, without necessarily giving up on its later becoming part of a Greater 
Serbia. Because the YPA took every weapon and piece of equipment it could carry 
and destroyed the rest, the new Macedonian state was defenseless. Milosevic 
believed that Macedonia, left economically dependent and exposed to the 
depredations of what were known as the ‘three wolves’ (Albania, Bulgaria and 
Greece), would crawl back to Serbian protection”
9
.  
Milosevic's strategy was based on the fact that the withdrawal of the YNA 
(with full military equipment) would leave Macedonia totally without defense 
against its neighbors, who, historically, have claims for its territory. Following this 
logic, Macedonia itself will require protection from its Serb neighbors and 
voluntarily will request inclusion in the new Serb-dominated mini-federation, in 
which Macedonia will have some kind of autonomy. The second scenario predicts 
a new division of Macedonia where Serbia, would take part on force. That 
Macedonia was left practically without any defense, claims Phillips, also “(…) the 
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Yugoslav Army adopted a virtual  scorched earth policy, destroying or removing 
facilities and equipment that was the property of the Macedonian Territorial 
Defense (...) Even military hospitals and stores buildings were withdrawn when the 
JNA pulled out”
10
. So, not only that YNA withdrew with its entire equipment and 
tried to make everything it could not bear useless, but it did the same thing with 
Macedonia's territorial defense, which consciously was directed in leaving 
Macedonia totally without defen. 
The withdrawal of the YNA and this initial Macedonian victory could 
easily be of a temporary nature. Practically, the independence of Macedonia, at any 
time, could be prejudiced by a decision brought from Belgrade, and with the help 
of the powerful Yugoslav army. Such insecurity on, practically non-recognized by 
Belgrade, northern border of Macedonia, was a constant danger and threat to 
Macedonia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Macedonia infrastructural 
looking was a way subordinated to the former capital. “(…) nearly all of 
Macedonia’s communications links, by rail or by telephone, were routed through 
Serbia and Belgrade”
11
. In situation like this the construction of relations between 
Skopje and Belgrade were never placed on equal grounds, like between two 
independent states, but it was constant accompanied by the element of possible 
threat of a stronger side, which in this case was Belgrade. About the attitude of 
Milosevic to the rights of the Macedonian people for their own state Phillips states 
“Milosevic was outraged by Macedonia declaring independence, accusing Skopje 
of stabbing him the back”
12
. Accordingly, Milosevic believed that Macedonia itself 
by “having the nerve” to become independent, turns it back on him. With the fact 
that Macedonia did not want to stay in Serb-dominated Yugoslavia shows 
“ungratefulness”. 
But Macedonia will have never be independent if it has a vassal 
relationship to Belgrade and if it lives constantly under a threat of possible 
intervention by the Yugoslav army. Therefore, the withdrawal of the YNA was not 
sufficient to insure the independency and sovereignty of Macedonia. Additional 
measure was needed. That kind of a measure was found in the Resolution 743/93 
of the UN, about setting UNPROFOR troupes at Macedonian borders. These 
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troops were in a small number and with strictly limited mandate. Contrary to 
common conception, they were not mandated to defend a possible invasion to 
Macedonia, but they were only for monitoring and reporting about the situation on 
the northern and western Macedonian border. This was an initiative launched by 
the Macedonian authorities and represented a crucial move for at least two 
matters. First, and perhaps most important one, is that these troops were primarily 
composed of USA soldiers. This shows the beginning of rapprochement between 
Macedonia and the United States in one hand, despite the termination of 
relationships and subordination to Belgrade, from the other side. At some level this 
was a surprise to many who were seeing Gligorov like a person close to Milosevic, 
but Milcin according to Ackermann said: “(…) Gligorov maintained close ties with 
USA Ambassador Zimmermann and, through him, with the  United 
States”
13
. Secondly, this move meant a kind of recognition of independence of the 
Republic by the international community and finally American dominated 
UNPROFOR troops sent a signal to all the neighbors of Macedonia who may have 
certain claims on its territory. So the departure of the YNA and sending 
UNPROFOR troupes were the most important events that strengthened the fragile 
Macedonian independence and sovereignty. 
The first reactions in Serbia on occasion of proclamation of independence 
of the Republic of Macedonia were different and can be generally divided in two 
groups. The first group consisted of people with more rational attitudes; these are 
the politicians who correctly recognized the reality of existence of Macedonian 
state and the fact that Serbia “gave up” from Vardar Macedonia with the creation 
of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia) 
Yugoslavia and also recognized the uniqueness of Macedonian people and 
language. The second group was composed of pro-nationalistic circles which still 
tend to see Macedonia as “southern Serbia” and the Macedonians as “Southserbs”. 
Pretty illustrative is following “The Premier (Milan Panic) raised the issue in front 
of the federal government for recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia from 
Yugoslavia. The government accepted the proposal for Slovenia, and Panic had a 
heated debate with the President from that time Dobrica Cosic in which Cosic 
said: Well you do not know what you are doing, it is our people and our country, 
and we are not allowed to play with what Serbian army in history had shed blood! 
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Then he spoke of the Balkan Wars: That part of Macedonia belongs to us and why 
should we now recognize an independent state and all in that spirit...”
 14
(Translation by D.M.). Last excerpt depicts the existence of two streams in Serbia 
in the early 90s regarding the recognition of Macedonian independence. So, Prime 
Minister required a rather European move by Yugoslavia, by recognizing the 
independence of Slovenia and Macedonia. Such unconditional recognition would 
have been basis for building good relations between both countries and would 
certainly impact positively on the image of Yugoslavia/Serbia. However, this did 
not happen just because of the opposition by the second group, embodied in 
President Cosic in concrete example. The existence of two streams is reflected in 
the following two contradictory moves by official representatives of Yugoslavia, 
too. So according to the head of the Yugoslav diplomacy in Panic’s government, it 
was said: “It is necessary to normalize the relations with Macedonia and it should 
be recognized (...) and for Yugoslavia the name Macedonia is not a problem 
because it's their name”
15
 (Translation by D.M.). In parallel with this statement 
was also the statement given by then-President of Yugoslavia Dobrica Cosic who 
in writing to his Greek counterparts said that Yugoslavia will not recognize 
Macedonia”
16
. (Translation by D.M.) 
Unfortunately the Serbian-Macedonian relations, just a day before the New 
Year’s Eve in 1993 at the Assembly of Yugoslavia voted for no confidence of 
Panic’s government. Practically this means destroying the opportunities for quick 
recognition. The situation with the recognition of Macedonia and Serbia stagnates 
and Serbia/Yugoslavia was not considering seriously the recognition of Macedonia 
until 1995, when Gligorov had meeting with Milosevic and this question was 
raised again. In Belgrade in April 1996 both countries signed the agreement on 
regulating mutual relations by the foreign ministers
17
. Finally, almost 5 years after 
the proclamation of independence of Macedonia relations between the two 
neighbors became normalized and diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level were 
established
18
. The recognition of Macedonia was a positive step. But in reality it 
                                                
14
 . !"#,   , , $%%&'(%(, 2001, p. 418.
15
Ibidem, p. 398. 
16
Ibidem. 
17
 Frckovski from Macedonia and Milutinovic from FR Yugoslavia. 
18
For first ambassador of RM in SR Yugoslavia was appointed Slavko Milosavlevski and the first 
ambassador of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Macedonia was Zoran Janachkovich. 
81,E	<=	


124 
came to a moment where no other option was available for Serbia anymore. Giving 
recognition so late opens several questions and concerns about the possible 
intentions and calculations of Milosevic about Macedonia. Occasional incidents on 
the Macedonian-Yugoslav border, speculations with the number of Serbs in 
Macedonia, the semi-public diplomacy with Greece about Macedonia's future have 
raised doubts about Milosevic's intentions towards Macedonia. However the 
presence of UNPROFOR troops on the Macedonian northern border and Serbia’s 
preoccupation with the wars in Croatia and B&H seems to have been key factors in 
deterring Milosevic from beginning of possible adventures in Macedonia. 
With the recognition of Macedonia and the normalization of the relations 
between the two neighbors none of the major questions were closed. There were 
other two major issues that had capacity to destabilize the RM above all.  First, 
after recognition, remained open the question of demarcation of the former 
administration and now inter-state border between Macedonia and Serbia. This has 
to be done only with Serbia because the rest borders of Macedonia were already 
precisely determined and marked on the ground as southern border of the former 
Yugoslavia. Second, although Serbia officially recognized independent Macedonia 
and formally did not deny the specificity of its nation and its language, the SOC 
(Serbian Orthodox Church) refused to recognize the MOC (Macedonian Orthodox 
Church). Namely SOC treated MOC as its part, in the same way like in the time 
when the Vardar part of Macedonia was “southern Serbia”. Prolonging to resolve 
these problematic issues by Milosevic gives us the right to doubt in certain rear 
intentions and deliberately keeping these potential destabilizing moments open that 
at certain moments could be activated. Thus, we can only speculate about the 
interest which Milosevic had with leaving the border question opened, whether it 
could be future requests for certain changes in the former administrative border, or 
it would have some role in the future solving of the Kosovo issue. 
Whatever the motives and speculation are, one thing is for sure, the 
demarcation of the border, and although classified as a matter of purely technical 
nature it was devilishly hard work. It was actually one of the bitterest issues for the 
Macedonian foreign policy. Macedonia had to negotiate with Belgrade in an 
official instance, but Kosovo asked to be involved too. Belgrade opposed this 
because for them Kosovo was not a state so it cannot be official negotiation party. 
On the other hand Kosovo authorities threatened that will not respect any 
agreement between Skopje and Belgrade if they are not included in this process 
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too. This condition has put Macedonia in very hard situation. Coincidentally or 
not, the military conflict in Macedonia from 2001 broke out immediately after the 
agreement between Macedonia and SR Yugoslavia about marking the border. 
The second open issue was the issue of constant denial position of SOC 
towards the autocephalous status of Macedonian Orthodox Church. If the border 
issue was qualified as purely technical issue, then this issue was qualified by 
Milosevic as a religious and not interstate. Treating the issue as a matter with 
religious character also continued after the era of Milosevic in Serbia and was 
slowly accepted by Macedonian side too. The basis of this claim is in the 
constitutions of both states in which it is stated that religion/church is separated 
from the state. According to this whenever somebody asked for resolving of this 
issue on state level, it was simply said that politicians cannot influence the SOC 
because the church is separated from the state. The constitutional provisions for 
separation of church from state in both states are undisputed. But we do not agree 
that this issue is of a purely religious nature. It is rather a particularly sensitive 
issue with deep historical roots that can affect the relations between Serbia and 
Macedonia. In reality, very little was missing to break out an interstate incident 
when SOC banned officially celebration of the holiday Ilinden in the monastery 
“Prohor Pcinski”
19
 and removed all signs indicating that in this monastery the 
Macedonian state was founded or when there’re some incidents with the 
unrecognized Archdiocese of Vranishkovski. In our believe, keeping this issue 
under the carpet hides a possible danger and possible generator of future 
instabilities in Macedonia that can certainly be reflected in the Macedonian - 
Serbian relations and can very easily get out of the context of “religious” issue. 
The following is also noted as positive things that give a good stimulus for 
building future relations between Serbia and Macedonia: 
Firstly, mutual recognition of existence of minorities in both countries. In 
any of the republics, there is certain number of ethnic minority members, who are 
actual majority members the other neighboring Republic. That means that in RM 
there are citizens, members of the Serbian ethnic minority and in Serbia and there 
are citizens of Macedonian ethnic origin. In both countries, these minorities are 
recognized and enjoy the usual minority rights. In RM Serbs are even mentioned in 
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the Constitution. Serbs themselves by organizing into political parties and their 
participation in coalition governments that are typical of Macedonia are often part 
of the highest executive in the country. In Serbia, otherwise, the Macedonians have 
generally satisfactory level of respect of their minority rights, especially in 
Vojvodina, more concretely in Jabuka. 
Secondly, the recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name, 
despite the pressures by Greece. This move was quite reasonable and expected. 
This is especially true because Macedonia and the Macedonians were named as 
Macedonia and Macedonians by Belgrade officially for nearly 50 years during the 
common federation. Thus, a possible recognition of Macedonia under references or 
provisional names would be funny, but for a situation in which was Macedonia 
even tragic if only one of its four neighbors would recognize it under its 
constitutional name. Therefore this move of Belgrade had exceptional importance 
for Macedonia. 
Thirdly, at the height of the Kosovo crisis and NATO bombing of Serbia, 
various calculations were made for a possible ground offensive by NATO. Despite 
the fact that Republic of Macedonia had a powerful Albanian party in the coalition 
government, despite the fact that it aspired to join NATO, yet it build a very 
principled position that was also a gesture of friendship towards Serbian people. 
The position of Macedonia was that it will not allow its territory to be used to 
attack any of its neighbors. 
As a bigger disruption in the relations between Serbia and Macedonia the 
moment of recognition of the independence of Kosovo by Macedonia together 
with Montenegro would be emphasized. After this move Belgrade officially 
reacted by expelling the Macedonian and Montenegrin ambassador from Serbia. 
Yet re-normalization of relations between the two countries comes relatively 
quickly. 
However, it can be concluded that there are no open questions
20
 between 
both neighbors. Most of Macedonia’s infrastructure connections lead through 
Serbia further on, there is also an economic cooperation, numerous family and 
friendly connections between ordinary people - citizens of both countries, the 
dissolution between this two neighbors was done without conflict. All this gives 
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hope and a good basis for improving the future relations between the two 
neighbors. After all, if Serbia could improve its relations with Croatia and work 
together on joint projects such as infrastructure connections with the old Yugoslav 
railway, for instance, then why Macedonia could not promote its relations with 
Serbia even more? However, the Euro-Atlantic integration of both countries would 
be the most reliable guarantee of peace in the region and cooperation between the 
two countries. In this context, both countries as one of the priorities in its foreign 
policies have the membership in the EU, but it is not the case with joining NATO 
by Serbia. Serbia’s reasons to doubt are understandable. Just few years earlier that 
alliance bombed Serbia. The refusal to NATO-integration by Serbia in short-term 
will not have any serious consequences, but in long-term certain consequences are 
possible to follow. 
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